Philosophy Of Mind - An Essay In The Metaphysics Of Psychology

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND PKEFACE THIS book is an essay in the speculative treatment of cer tain problems, suggested but not usually discussed in the course of a thorough empirical study of mental phe nomena. Inasmuch as these problems all relate to the real nature and actual performances and relations of the human mind, the essay may properly be called metaphysical Let it be confessed, then, that the author comes forward with a treatise in metaphysics, in the more special meaning of that term. I think, however, that in spite of the marked disfavor into which all metaphysics has fallen in certain quarters, no detailed apology for asking readers for such a treatise need be offered in its Preface. Indeed, the first two chapters of the book are occupied in showing how inevitable is the demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of all its principal problems. If, then, this demand is not made perfectly clear by the more detailed discussion which follows, it would be quite useless to put it forward unsupported, at the beginning of my task, in the hope of producing a favorable first impression upon re luctant intelligences. As to the kind of metaphysics which it is designed to offer, two or three preliminary remarks seem important. And, first of all, it is to be open and undisguised. Of all bad meta viii PREFACE physics, the very worst is likely to be that which is unavowed and concealed, sometimes even from the author himself, while as yet he is engaged in criticising the metaphysical views of others, or in denouncing metaphysical essays in general. No one whose peace of mind is sure to be disturbed by any attempt, however carried out, at this form of reflective thinking should venture beyond the titlepage and table of contents of this volume. On the other hand, however, I wish to be held responsible for two things which arc required in order to entitle to respect every treatise of a similar char acter. These are, first, the statement of the facts and laws, scientifically established, to which the speculative discussion constantly refers for its own grounds in experience, And for metaphysics which has no foundations in incontestable experience, I have as little respect as has any one. But besides this constant appeal to facts and to laws empirically established, sound reasoning is indispensable for the deriva tion of acceptable conclusions in any metaphysical enterprise. Any reader, or critic, therefore, who will point out viola tions of either of these two requirements, will be entitled to grateful recognition for his service, no less by the author than by the readers of this volume. A few words concerning the relations which this book sus tains to preceding works by the same author will be helpful for its better understanding. In some sort the entire volume may be regarded as in continuation of a scries of works 1 on psychology, or the science of mental phenomena. This science, which, as a science, is, and ever must remain, chiefly descriptive, starts many inquiries regarding the real nature and relations to the external world, and especially to the 1 Elements of Physiological Psychology, 1887 Outlines of Physiological Psy chology, 1891 Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, 1894 Primer of Psychology, 1894. All published by Chas. Scribners Sons. PREFACE ix body, of that subject of all the phenomena, which we are accustomed to call themind. The partial consideration, at least, of such inquiries is extremely difficult to separate from the attempt at anything like a comprehensive treatment of psychology. But these very inquiries can be carried only a little way before they become so inextricably mingled with comprehensive problems in general philosophy as to make us aware that we are already at some distance from that form of discussion which is appropriate to a descriptive science...