The Political Road To War With Iraq: Bush, 9/11 And The Drive To Overthrow Saddam

As insurgency continues to plague Iraq and coalition forces struggle to maintain control, leaders in both Washington and London continue to assert that their course of action was the right one, a crucial question is: how did this situation arise?
This book argues that the Bush Administration was intent on regime change in Iraq on entering office in 2000 for a number of reasons, including:
* the enduring strategic importance of the Persian Gulf;
* growing disdain for the containment policy constructed after the 1991 Gulf War;
* the neo-conservatives desire for a robust foreign policy grounded in use of military and political power to secure US national interests.
This books central argument is that military conflict between the United States and Iraq was highly likely, if not inevitable, after September 11. This argument is based on a detailed examination of statements made by senior members of the Bush administration, senior members of Congress and influential neo-conservative commentators, together with empirical analysis of what actually took place in the build up to the war.
This is essential reading for all students of security studies, peace studies, US politics and the Middle East.