Whole World On Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in anorganizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S.government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fightstrategic nuclear war? U.S. bombing in World War II caused massive damage by fireto Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later on the war plans took account only of damage fromthe blast; they completely ignored the damage from atomic firestorms. Whole World onFire shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing onwhat they do well and systematically excluding what they don't do well, maybuild a poor representation of the world - a self reinforcing fallacy that canhave serious consequences. In a sweeping conclusion, the author shows the implicationsof this analysis for understanding such things as the sinking of the Titanic,the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and the poor fireproofing in theWorld Trade Center.